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Modeling Interdependent Participation Incentives: Dynamics of a 
Voluntary Livestock Disease Control Program* 
 
Abstract: This paper models producers’ interdependent incentives to participate in a voluntary 
livestock disease control program. Under strategic complementarity among participation 
decisions, after a slow start momentum can build such that market premium for participation 
and participation rate increase sequentially. Non-participation, partial participation and full 
participation can all be Nash equilibria while participation cost heterogeneity will dispose the 
outcome toward incomplete participation. We find plausible conditions under which temporary 
government subsidies to the least cost-effective producers causes tipping toward full 
participation. Applying parameters from the literature on Johnes’ disease, we illustrate factors 
that may affect participation. These include cost heterogeneity and program effectiveness.  
Keywords: Incentives, livestock disease, momentum theorem, strategic complementarity, 
tipping, voluntary program. 
JEL classification: Q18, D83, L15  
   
 4 
 
 
 
 1 
 
1.  Introduction 
Mandatory animal disease eradication programs have been a focus of government activity for 
more than a century. For example, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
campaign to eradicate the bovine tuberculosis (TB) between 1917 and 1940 was considered to 
have prevented at least 25,000 human TB deaths annually (Olmstead and Rhode 2004). While 
mandatory programs can be effective in bringing highly contagious diseases under control, 
staunch resistance to such mandates are common (Olmstead and Rhode 2007; Anderson 2010). 
As a result, voluntary control and certification programs have been promoted for several 
diseases. Examples include the Voluntary Trichinae Certification Program, the Chronic 
Wasting Disease Voluntary Herd Certification Program and the Voluntary Bovine Johne’s 
Disease Control Program, all ongoing in the United States. The reward for being labeled as 
disease-free is a market-determined premium. For Johne’s disease, survey results show that 
premiums exist for producers who participate in voluntary certification programs (Kovich, 
Wells and Friendshuh 2006; Benjamin et al. 2009).  
The success of a voluntary program hinges on producer participation (CDCJD 2003). A 
natural question to ask is whether a voluntary control program provides producers with 
sufficient incentive to participate. Such a question has been addressed extensively in the 
environmental literature (Khanna 2001). At the individual firm level, it is generally assumed 
that voluntary programs involve lower implementation costs (Segerson and Miceli 1998); and 
that government subsidies provide firms with incentives to participate (Stranlund 1995; Wu 
and Babcock 1999). Participation incentives at an industry level have also been studied 
(Dawson and Segerson 2008; Millock and Salanie 2000). When multiple firms are involved 
and the government’s aim is to reach a certain aggregate abatement level, some firms may have 
incentives to free ride on participation by other firms. We can view the firms’ abatement 
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decisions as strategic substitutes according to Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985). 
There is also an emerging literature on voluntary food safety programs where the incentive to 
participate is only analyzed at the individual firm level. The producer’s incentive to join the 
voluntary program could come from the looming threat of a mandatory program (Fares and 
Rouviere 2010) or from government subsidies. 
Extant analyses of voluntary programs tend to omit the interrelated nature of participation 
incentives. Even among studies that do consider firm interactions, interdependence in 
participation incentives is only studied in a static framework. In reality, however, almost all 
voluntary programs span multiple years, with evolving participation rates. Therefore, to 
evaluate firm participation incentives it is important to consider dynamic interactions among 
participant choices. This paper provides a pilot work on the issue. We provide a dynamic 
model in the context of a voluntary livestock disease control program.  
Critical to model mechanics is the dynamic evolution of the price premium for proven 
disease-free product. Our goal is to analyze producers’ incentives to participate in a disease 
control program that involves a disease status test, and subsequent incentives to release test 
information in order to acquire any market premium. As such our paper is closely connected 
with the quality disclosure literature. Under two strict assumptions, namely that i) disclosure is 
costless and ii) producers have full information about their quality, earlier studies found that all 
producers will disclose except the one with the lowest possible quality type (Grossman and 
Hart 1980). The market solves the information problem through unraveling, in a manner that is 
the reverse of that encountered in Akerlof’s lemons problem (Viscusi 1978).  
When assumption i) is relaxed, models by Jovanovic (1982), and Levin, Peck and Ye 
(2005) have found that only high-quality types would disclose. Alternatively, Matthews and 
Postlewaite (1985), Farrell (1986) and Shavell (1994) relaxed assumption ii) by assuming that 
sellers originally do not have information on their products’ quality. Sellers could incur a test 
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cost to acquire this information, where it is costless to disclose once acquired. They show that 
under voluntary disclosure sellers of the low cost type would acquire such information, and 
then disclose whenever it is favorable. A mandatory disclosure rule in this case would decrease 
the sellers’ incentive to acquire the quality information in the first place.  
Our model is based on Shavell (1994), where producers make two choices. These are a) 
whether to participate in the program to obtain quality information and possibly improve their 
quality, and then, if obtained, b) whether to disclose such information. Whereas Shavell 
assumed voluntary participation while disclosure could be either voluntary or mandatory, in 
this paper we use mandatory participation as a benchmark for comparison while disclosure is 
always voluntary. We extend Shavell’s model to a dynamic setup, where we show that the 
participation premium hinges on the participation rate over time. This allows us to prove that 
producer decisions are strategic complements. Therefore even if only very few producers have 
the incentive to participate initially, they might in turn provide the remaining producers with 
sufficient incentive to participate. This phenomenon is referred to as tipping. The reasoning 
here resembles that in Dixit (2003), who shows how a small group of enthusiasts could initiate 
a process that subsequently induces all to join a club. This observation is important in that it 
provides insights on how animal disease program managers can engineer more efficient 
equilibria through selective subsidies.  
Schelling’s concept of tipping has been generalized by Gladwell (2000) to a wide range of 
problems. Heal and Kunreuther (2005) have explored the matter in a general interdependent 
risk setup. Tipping can occur when there are two or more equilibria and the system displays 
sufficient increasing differences (Heal and Kunreuther 2010). In the present paper, increasing 
differences arise because when more firms participate then the change in payoff to a firm upon 
participating will increase, i.e., the premium from participation will increase. 
The premium increase arises from the declining health status among the non-disclosing 
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herds, who are comprised of i) non-participating producers, and ii) participating producers that 
prefer not to reveal herd disease status. Every period, the average disease-free rate among non-
disclosing herds is Bayesian updated and it decreases when more producers participate. As a 
result, momentum will build where three events successively reinforce each other. These are a 
decrease in the average disease-free rate among non-disclosing herds, an increase in 
participation premium and an increase in participation rate as a rational market response to the 
change in premium. 
The paper’s layout is as follows. After reviewing historical examples of voluntary and 
mandatory programs, we study how producers’ participation decisions interact in a voluntary 
program. To provide a benchmark comparison, we also investigate a mandatory program. 
Besides tipping and strategic complementarity issues, our paper addresses roles for mandates 
and targeted subsidy policies as well as implications of cost heterogeneity. To illustrate, a 
simulation analysis on a voluntary Johne’s disease herd status program (VJDHSP) is carried 
out where the parameters are obtained from the current Johne’s disease literature.  
 
2.  Examples of voluntary and mandatory programs 
2.1.  Voluntary Johne’s disease herd status program (VJDHSP) 
Johne’s disease (JD) has a long incubation period and clinical signs are rarely seen before two 
years of age. It is highly prevalent in the United States. According to the National Animal 
Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) dairy survey study of 2007, 68.1% of U.S. dairy herds 
were infected with the causative bacterium, Mycobacterium paratuberculosis (Mptb) (USDA 
2008). Although the weight of evidence presently suggests no direct link between JD and 
Crohn’s disease in humans, there is less agreement about any role it may play (Friswell, 
Campbell and Rhodes 2010). Due to production losses and zoonotic concerns, Johne’s disease 
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has been prioritized for control in the United States (CDCJD 2003) and the VJDHSP was 
developed to certify paratuberculosis free herds. Three key components of the program are i) 
education, ii) management, and iii) herd testing and classification. The purpose of iii) is to 
publicly recognize participating producers if they so desire.  
Many U.S. states have established programs similar to the national VJDHSP (USDA 
2010a), where Minnesota’s program (MNJDCP) is among the most successful. Starting from 
less than 0.9% in 1999, the program’s dairy herd participation rate had increased to 30.8% by 
the end of 2006, likely due in part to federal funding that commenced in 2003. Larger herds 
were more likely to participate than smaller herds. During 2005-’06, 52.9% of Minnesota dairy 
herds with ≥ 500 cows participated, in contrast with 9.9% among herds with < 50 cows (Wells, 
Hartmann and Anderson 2008). Meanwhile the program’s beef herd participation rate had 
increased from less than 0.1% to 2.1%. 
Benefits from participation include increased productivity and marketing opportunities 
(Kovich, Wells, and Friendshuh 2006; Benjamin et al. 2009). Also, as one program purpose is 
to provide a source of low-infection risk replacement cows (Kovich, Wells, and Friendshuh 
2006), the industry would be well-prepared in the event that any link between Johne’s disease 
in cattle and Crohn’s disease were confirmed. 
 
2.2.  Texas fever 
Texas tick fever was a major threat to the U.S. cattle industry from the Antebellum until the 
end of World War I. Efforts to eradicate tick carriers started as early as 1898, where initially 
participation had been voluntary. However it was soon recognized that eradication efforts 
would not succeed unless all cattle in a given area were treated, and so participation became 
mandatory in 1906.  
Active resistance to the programs quickly emerged. Resistance was most intense among 
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small-scale operators where per unit compliance costs were largest, leading to at least one 1922 
murder in Arkansas (Hope 2005, pp. 10-12). As Strom (2000) notes, small farmer’s “violent 
opposition to this program was founded in sound economic reasoning.” However, larger 
ranchers began to see the benefit of eradication as sources for re-infection diminished, 
prospects for controlling residual infected areas increased, more areas were removed from 
federal quarantine and returns on treated animals increased. That is, a virtuous cycle of events 
led to a better equilibrium for those who could bear eradication costs. By 1933 Texas fever was 
no longer a major problem for the cattle industry (USDA 1933).  
 
2.3.  National animal identification system (NAIS) 
NAIS is a U.S. government initiative launched in 2002 to establish a nationwide farm-level 
animal ID system to better manage disease outbreaks. The U.S. Animal Identification Plan 
(USAIP) was initially intended to be mandatory. In 2006 however, NAIS participation was 
made voluntary in the face of stiff opposition to compulsion. Approximately 36% of U.S. 
livestock premises had been registered by 2009. Participation rates in the premises registration 
step have been very high for poultry (95%), sheep (95%), high for swine (80%), but only 18% 
for cattle (Schnepf 2009).  
Participation cost heterogeneity could explain the large differences in participation rates. 
According to NAIS (2009), the average per animal cost was $0.0007/broiler, $0.002/turkey, 
$0.0195/layer, $0.059/swine, $1.39/sheep and $5.97/bovine. The swine and poultry industries 
have much lower unit costs because animal tracing requirements for these species do not 
involve individual identification devices. Also, unit participation costs typically decrease with 
herd size; see, e.g., tables 2 and 3 of NAIS (2009).  
The benefit from NAIS implementation increases as participation levels increase. 
According to simulation results in NAIS Benefit-Cost Research Team (2009), in the event of 
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Foot and Mouth disease outbreak “producer monetary losses for an animal identification and 
tracking program with a 90% participation rate would be $4.5 billion less than a program with 
a 30% participation rate.” For bovines this program was largely unsuccessful, due partly to 
failure by the USDA to communicate program benefits to producers (Anderson 2010). 
 
3.  Voluntary program 
In a voluntary program, a producer makes his own decision on whether to participate based on 
participation benefits and costs. These benefits and costs evolve during the course of the 
program, and it is necessary to explicitly model the evolution of incentives.  
 
3.1.  Model scheme 
Similar to Shavell (1994), we commence with a model of information acquisition and 
disclosure. In our context, information is referred to as knowledge on a herd’s disease-free rate, 
i.e., the number of disease-free animals divided by the number of animals in the herd. In this 
paper we will analyze a situation where neither producers nor buyers know the precise quality 
of the good (Shavell 1994; Matthews and Postlewaite 1985). A third party provides tests as a 
part of the voluntary program to reveal the disease status to producers. 
A herd’s disease-free rate is denoted by [ 1]r r ,  with distribution function ( )F r . While 
( )F r  is common knowledge among all producers, a herd’s particular r remains unknown prior 
to program participation.1 Participation cost is denoted by [ ]c c,c  with distribution function 
( )G c . Each producer is only aware of his own participation cost. In Assumption 1, we will 
                                                            
1 The current literature on animal disease generally assumes an asymmetric information 
structure, i.e., only producers have full information about their herd’s disease status (Gramig, 
Horan, and Wolf 2009; Sheriff and Osgood 2010). However, producer knowledge about some 
chronic diseases can be very limited due to their long incubation periods. 
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define the relationship between the participation cost and disease-free rate.  
Assumption 1: Herd participation costs are statistically independent of herd’s disease-free rates. 
 
Assumption 1 is supported by observations in Pillars et al. (2009), who conducted a 5-year 
longitudinal study of six Michigan dairy herds infected with JD. The data collected in their 
paper shows no pattern of correlation between disease prevalence rate and participation cost. 
The model scheme is as follows. In period t , producers decide whether to participate based 
on the expected price premium realized in the previous period, 1tI  . Assume that producers 
participate whenever their expected price premium 1tI   is no less than the cost so that 
proportion t   1( )t-G I  of producers participate. Upon obtaining the test result, a participant 
will disclose whenever the result exceeds the average disease-free rate among silent producers 
in the previous period, 1
S
tr  . Silent producers are comprised of two groups: producers 1) who 
choose not to participate in the program; and 2) who participate but prefer not to disclose any 
information. Here we assume that buyers cannot distinguish between the two groups. We also 
assume that there are many producers in the market and a single producer's participation 
decision cannot affect the overall market participation rate.  
Based on participation and disclosure rates, an updated average disease status among silent 
producers in period t will be determined as Str . In turn, a new price premium from 
participation will be solved as tI . We will elaborate on the determination of tI  and Str  later. 
Note that except for the specified distributions on disease-free rate and participation cost, all 
other variables in the model scheme are endogenous. The process continues indefinitely 
through time where Figure 1 displays a model scheme. The price premium from participation 
will also depend on the information conveyed by the test results. We assume that the test 
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reveals the exact disease-free rate to participating producers.2  
 
3.2.  Determination of participation premium 
In period t  testing reveals the exact disease-free rate, r , to the producer. The expected unit 
animal value for the herd with disease-free rate r  is (1 )V Vr r   . Here V  and V  denote 
the values of healthy and diseased animals, respectively. Parameter   can vary by disease and 
indicates the perceived consequences. If buyers perceive no harm then 1  , but 1   
otherwise. Indeed one would expect 0   whenever the disease causes serious human health 
problems, e.g., whenever the animal’s produce can find no market. The average disease-free 
rate among silent producers is Str . How equilibrium 
S
tr  is determined will be discussed shortly.  
As non-participants belong to the group of silent producers, the unit livestock price of a 
non-participating herd is 1 (1 )t
S S
t tr rp V V   . A participant will reveal herd r  whenever it is 
greater than Str  and will remain silent otherwise. Thus the realized price for a participating 
herd animal takes the form:  
 2
(1 ) , whenever  
(1 ) , wheneve
;
r  .
S S S
t t t
t S
t
V V rr r
p
r rV r V
r
r


         (1) 
The realized premium from participation is calculated as:  
 2 1
0, whenever  ;
(1 ) ( ), whenever  .
S
t
t t S S
t t
r r
p p
V r r r r
        (2) 
The ex-ante expected price premium from participating in the program is: 
 
1
( , , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ),
S
t
S S
t t tr
I r V V r r dF r     (3) 
                                                            
2 A second scenario, referred to as coarse grading, is studied in supplemental materials. It seeks 
to better replicate threshold rate classifications in actual programs. 
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leading to some comparative statics for the expected premium’s trajectory. 
Lemma 1: The expected premium from participation will increase whenever one of the 
following holds: i) Society becomes more aware of the disease, / 0tI    ; ii) the value of an 
animal increases, / 0tI V   , or iii) the average disease-free rate among silent producers 
decreases, / 0St tI r   . 
 
All nontrivial proofs are provided in Supplementary Materials (SM). From item ii) in 
Lemma 1 we learn that producers will have stronger incentives to participate whenever the unit 
livestock value increases. Therefore, when compared to dairy cow producers, beef cow 
producers have weaker incentives to participate as illustrated by the different participation rates 
in the MNJDCP. Item iii) conveys that the expected premium from participation will increase 
whenever the average disease-free rate among non-disclosing herds decreases. Intuitively, as 
the perceived mean quality in the unknown pool declines, buyers are willing to pay a larger 
premium to obtain livestock with a confirmed high disease-free rate. For the remainder of our 
formal analysis we will consider   and V to be fixed. To economize on notation we write  
(1 )V  and contract ( , , )St tI r V  to ( , )St tI r   or just ( )St tI r . 
 
3.3.  Market equilibrium 
The program commences in period 0. Initially 0 0 as no producer participates. The average 
disease status among silent producers is the unconditional mean of r  labeled as er , i.e., 
0
S er r  1 ( )
r
rdF r . By eqn. (3), the price premium in period 0 is: 
 
0
1
0 0 0( ) ( ) ( ).S
S S
r
I I r r r dF r    (4) 
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According to the model scheme in Figure 1, in period 1 producers with participation costs no 
more than 0I  will participate. Thus the overall participation rate is 1 0 0( ) ( ( ))
SG I G I r   . 
Among participants, those who obtain a disease-free rate less than 0
Sr  will not disclose any 
information on their disease status. This group has mass measure 1 0( )
SF r  with the average 
disease-free rate 
0
0( | )S
e S
r r
r E r r r   . In addition, non-participants cannot disclose their disease-
free rates. They have mass measure 11   with the average disease-free rate er . The average 
disease-free rate among silent producers is Bayesian updated in period 1 as:  
 
0
1 1 1
1
1
1 1
1 1
0
1
0
( ) (1 ( ))    whenever  1;
( )
,                                      whenever  1;
( )( ) .
( ) 1
SS
S
e
r r
S
er
r
r
r
F
F
r
r
    

   
    
  
  (5) 
The denominator in the expression for 1( )   represents the proportion of silent producers 
among all producers, while the numerator represents the proportion of participants who choose 
not to disclose the result among all producers. After solving for 1
Sr  by way of (5), we can 
calculate the expected premium in period 1 as 1( )
SI r  by (4). Note that when 1 1   then 1Sr   r  
and this is a rational expectations equilibrium.3 When 1 1   then (5) also presents a rational 
expectation for 1
Sr  on the part of buyers and so (5) supports internal consistency.  
The process repeats in each period t , {1,2, ... }t . Equilibrium will be reached at time t  
whenever some solution * *( , )r  is reached where *1t t      and *1S St tr r r   . Similar to 
                                                            
3 Were all producers to obtain their disease status information, then producers with a disease-
free rate higher than the average will choose to disclose. The average disease-free rate among 
non-disclosers will continue to decrease until it reaches r . Eventually all participants will 
disclose (Grossman and Hart 1980). 
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(5), the equilibrium condition is characterized by: 
 
*
* * *
* *
*
* *
* * *
* * *
( ) (1 ( ))    whenever   1;
( )
                                        whenever   1;
( )( ) ; ( ( )).
( ) 1
e e
r r
r r
r
r
F r G I r
F r
    

   
     
  
 (6) 
Were * 1  , then of course *r r . In this case the full-participation (FP) equilibrium is 
reached, the pool of silent producers will disappear and the price premium becomes ( )I I r . 
Were * 0  , then *( ( )) 0G I r  , * er r  and ( )eI I r . This characterizes the non-participation 
(NP) equilibrium. Lastly a partial-participation (PP) equilibrium is defined whenever *  
(0,1) , i.e., *( ( )) (0,1)G I r   and * ( , )er r r .  
The equilibrium condition in (6) was previously defined in Shavell (1994). However, 
Shavell did not recognize the need to redefine *r  at * 1  . In addition, our paper demonstrates 
dynamically how the equilibrium could be reached, a feature not captured in Shavell (1994). 
An understanding of the underlying dynamics is crucial because, as we will show, the 
complementary nature of participation decisions allows for multiple equilibria where tweaking 
the decision environment through policy interventions can tip equilibrium participation from 
very low to very high.  
Presently, for the sake of illustrating the nature of equilibrium and the potential for policy 
interventions we focus on static Nash equilibrium solutions. Two thresholds used in this 
division are min ( )
eI I r  and max ( )I I r , which stand for the premium at NP and FP 
equilibria, respectively. In Figure 2 the horizontal and vertical axes represent possible values of 
c  and c , i.e., producers’ lowest and the highest participation costs, respectively. As c c , 
the region below the 45 degree line in Figure 2 is infeasible. The area above the diagonal line is 
divided into six regions. All Nash equilibria are provided in Figure 2, but we distinguish 
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between two sorts of equilibria. Those not underlined are the ones that emerge with the default 
in initial point that no producers participate. Those underlined are ones that could be arrived at 
were the starting point to differ.4  
In light of producer participation incentives, we consider six regions in two categories. The 
first category consists of Regions R2, R3, R5 and R6. Absent subsidy all the producers in this 
category will inevitably make the same participation decision. For R2, R3 and R5, minI c   
c , so NP is the equilibrium arrived at when no one participates initially. In contrast, region R6 
with minc c I   only displays the FP equilibrium. The second category covers only R1 and 
R4. Then, under no subsidy, equilibrium participation decisions based on no initial 
participation are less clear. Underlined equilibria for R2, R4 and R5 require different initial 
expectations. 
We are particularly interested in region R4, with min maxc I c I   , and R5, with minI c  
maxc I  . In these two regions if government entices (perhaps by cheap talk) a sufficiently 
large subset of producers to participate first, then FP could be maintained without any subsidy. 
In Lemma 2 we will show that at least two equilibria can indeed exist in R5. For region R4 a 
similar proof can be readily developed.  
Lemma 2: Under a voluntary program, when min maxI c c I    then at least two equilibria 
exist. These are NP and FP.  
 
Moving from NP or PP to FP, perhaps because of some market event or economic 
engineering, is referred to as tipping. Here we assume that the NP and PP equilibria are viewed 
by the government as undesirable equilibria when compared to FP equilibrium.  
                                                            
4 To be more precise, it is what participants believe about the behavior of other producers that 
matters and not actual initial participation. 
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A last note on Figure 2 is that it also illustrates the effect of cost heterogeneity on 
equilibrium participation status. All points on the 45 degree line represent the case where 
minimum cost equals to the maximum cost, i.e., participation costs are homogenous among 
producers. In this case the equilibrium will be either FP or NP, depending on the cost level. By 
contrast, points further away from the 45 degree line denote cases where participation costs are 
more heterogeneous. Among regions, R1 has the most heterogeneous cost structure. In this 
region a proportion of lowest cost producers will always participate. However, FP cannot be 
reached unless the government consistently provides subsidies to the highest cost producers.  
Take the cow-calf sector in the NAIS program for example. Due to its high average 
participation cost and cost heterogeneity (NAIS 2009), its cost structure is mostly likely 
located in either R1 or R2. Therefore FP is unlikely to be reached without a government 
subsidy. In contrast, poultry and swine sectors have much lower NAIS program participation 
costs together with nearly full participation rates, so we are almost certain that cost structures 
for those two sectors are located in R6. As participation cost scale economies exists, cost 
heterogeneity is most likely to exist in industries where large and small firms co-exist. In this 
case large producers tend to join the program first while small producers will most likely find it 
unprofitable to join the program without government subsidies, as with Minnesota’s MNJDCP. 
Note that Lemma 2 only shows two guaranteed equilibria. However, whenever FP and NP 
are two guaranteed equilibrium, a PP equilibrium may also be possible depending on the 
producer cost structure. This point will be illustrated in Example 1 below, which depicts a case 
of tipping in region R5 after the government motivates a subset of producers to participate.  
Example 1 (Tipping): There are four participation costs, 1 2 3 4( , , , )c c c c (5.5,5.7,6.7,8) , and N 
producers with each. Here superscript is used to denote the cost type. Prior to participation, the 
disease-free rate of any herd is uniformly distributed on [ , ] [0.9,1]r r  . The unit livestock 
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value is 500V  , and 1 0.8  . First we establish: 
1 1
min max0.95 0.90
0.95 0.9500 0.8 5; 500 0.8 20.
1 0.9 1 0.9
r rI dr I dr          
Thus min maxI c c I   . By Lemma 2, both NP and FP are equilibria. Next we illustrate how 
the NP equilibrium can be tipped to the FP equilibrium.  
Period 0: We know that 0 0.95
S er r   so that the NP equilibrium will be reached without 
government intervention.  
Period 1: Suppose now that in period 1 the government provides a one-time subsidy of 0.5  
to producers of all cost types contingent on their participation. For type 1 producers the new 
cost will be reduced to 5. Thus 25% (as / 4 0.25N N  ) of producers will participate in period 
1. Among participants, fraction (0.95 0.9) / (1 0.9) 0.5    do not disclose. Therefore 
1( ) 0.25 0.5 / (0.25 0.5 0.75) 0.1429       . In period 1, average disease status among 
silent producers is: 
0
1 1 1 0.95( ) (1 ( )) 0.1429 0.8571 0.95 0.9464S
S e e e
rr r
r r r r            and 
the expected premium is 
1
1
1 1 1( ) 4000 ( ) 5.75S
S S
r
I I r r r dr     where 500(0.8)/(1-0.9)=4000.  
Period 2: In this period producers of cost type 1 and 2 will participate without subsidy 
because 1 2 1,max[ ]c c I . Among participants, share (0.9464 0.9) / (1 0.9) 0.464    will 
choose not to disclose their disease status. Thus 2( ) 0.5 0.464 / (0.5 0.464 0.5)        
0.3169 . In period 2, the average disease status among silent producers is 
1
2 2( ) S
S e
r r
r r   
 
2 0.9464(1 ( )) 0.3169 0.6831 0.95 0.9415
e e
rr r       , and expected premium is 2 2( )SI I r
2
1
24000 ( ) 6.84S
S
r
r r dr   .  
Period 3: Given 2I , cost types 1, 2 and 3 producers will participate without subsidy. 
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Among participants, 41.5% will choose not to disclose their disease status. Thus 3( )  
0.75 0.415 / (0.75 0.415 0.25) 0.5546    . In period 3, the average disease status among 
silent producers is 
2
3 3 3 0.9415( ) (1 ( )) 0.5546 0.4454 0.95 0.9338S
S e e e
rr r
r r r r          
 
and the expected premium is 
3
1
3 3 3( ) 4000 ( ) 8.76S
S S
r
I I r r r dr    .  
Period 4: Given the value of 3I , all producers will participate without subsidy. In turn all 
producers will disclose, so 4 0.9
Sr r   and 4( ) 20SI r  . Therefore in period 5 and thereafter, 
all producers will participate. The FP equilibrium * *( , ) (1,0.9)r   is reached.  
 
As an additional note on Lemma 2’s conclusion, suppose instead that the type 2 cost 
producers exceeds 5.75 in the example. Then, as 1 5.75I  , the tipping process will stall and 
only PP will be reached unless the government also provides a sufficient subsidy to types other 
than type 1. Therefore the PP equilibrium is also possible for region R5. 
Following Definition 2 in Heal and Kunreuther (2010), type 1 producers in Example 1 form 
a critical coalition. This is because if cost type 1 producers participate then the NP equilibrium 
will switch to the FP equilibrium. In our example, by taking advantage of this critical coalition, 
government only provides a total subsidy payment of 0.5N. Without recognizing the existence 
of this group, and so providing subsidies to all to bring net costs down to 5, the government 
would pay a total subsidy of (0.5 0.7 1.7 3) 5.9N N    . An even more costly case is where 
all producers are provided the marginal subsidy required to elicit participation by type 4. Then 
cost is 12N, a 24-fold increase over the tipping solution. 
The underlying reason for tipping in Example 1 is the strategic complementarity property 
among producer participation decisions, or ‘increasing difference’ (Heal and Kunreuther 
2010). The producers’ participation decisions are strategic complements if one producer’s 
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marginal payoff from participating increases whenever the participation rate increases, i.e., 
marginal returns to participation rise when more producers participate. Such a game is referred 
to as supermodular (Milgrom and Roberts 1990). 
Here the expected marginal payoff from participating at time t  is tI . Therefore, the 
strategic complementarity property holds if whenever 0 1t t      then ( ( ))St t tI r    
( ( ))St t tI r  . Next we will investigate whether this property is satisfied in the general model 
setup. This leads to our paper’s main result; strategic complementarity among participation 
decisions. In order to show this we will establish that the participation rate will increase 
whenever the previous period’s premium increases. 
Lemma 3: Suppose that the expected price premium in period 1t   is weakly greater than that 
in period t . Then the participation rate in period 2t   will be greater than that in period 1t  . 
That is, if t tI I  , then 1 1( ) ( )t t t tI I    .  
 
This result follows immediately from relation 1( )t tG I  , where cost distribution function 
(·)G  is non-decreasing. Next we will establish strategic complementarity, i.e., that the 
premium will increase whenever the participation rate in the same period increases.  
Proposition 1: Producer participation decisions are strategic complements. That is, whenever 
1 0t t      then ( ) ( )S St t t tr r    and ( ( )) ( ( ))S St t t t t tI r I r   . 
 
It is worth noting that strategic complementarity alone cannot guarantee a high 
participation rate. According to a simulation result in NAIS (2009), the benefit from NAIS 
would increase if participation rates increase. However as producers are generally unaware of 
potential program benefits (Anderson 2010) the program is unlikely to be attractive at the 
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outset, even among low-cost producers. As a result only a small fraction of producers are likely 
to participate, confirming the belief that participation generates little benefit. Such a vicious 
cycle repeats so that the program stalls at a low participation rate equilibrium.  
We will refer to the participation rates when plotted against time as the participation curve. 
Next we will provide a plausible condition under which the participation rate will increase over 
time without any intervention. This means that the participation curve itself is upward sloping. 
Assumption 2: Assume that ( ) ( )( )SS S e er rJ r r r r    is decreasing in [ , ]S er r r , where 
( )Sr  ( ) ( ) / [ ( ) ( ) 1 ( )]S S S S Sg r F r g r F r g r   denotes the proportion of participants among all 
silent producers and where ( )Sg r ( ( ))SG I r . 
 
Proposition 2, to follow, shows that Assumption 2 guarantees that 10
S S S
kr r r    
without any exogenous forces. This means that market interactions would ensure that the 
average disease-free rate among silent producers decreases monotonically over time. From 
Example 1, we can see that the average disease-free rate among the silent producers will 
strictly decrease conditional on types 1 having a participation cost below 5. This will generate 
momentum whereby the premium and participation rate both (weakly) increase over time.  
The outcome 10
S S S
kr r r    will generally apply when the easily computable uniform 
distribution is assumed on cost and disease rate distributions and value to be protected is not 
small. Supplemental materials provide a demonstration. Therefore we can be assured that 
Assumption 2 is plausible. 
Proposition 2: Under Assumption 2, then over time the i) average disease-free rate among 
silent producers is non-increasing, i.e., 10
S S S
kr r r   ; ii) participation premium is non-
decreasing, i.e., 0 1 kI I I   ; iii) participation rate is non-decreasing, i.e., 10 k     .  
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Proposition 2 is similar to the Momentum Theorem of Milgrom, Qian and Roberts (1991). 
This asserts that once a system starts along a path of growth in core variables,5 the process will 
continue indefinitely until some exogenous forces disturb the system. A steady increase in 
participation rates occurred over the years for MNJDCP (Wells, Hartmann and Anderson 2008) 
and also for the tick eradication program to control Texas fever.  
 
3.4.  Effect of program effectiveness on premium 
To this point we have assumed that the program does not improve herd health status. 
Henceforth we refer to such a program as the baseline program. In contrast, a technologically 
effective program is one where the act of participation improves the initial disease-free rate. Let 
the disease-free rate change from r  to ( ) [0,1]r  , where ( ) , [0,1]r r r     and the 
inequality is strict on some interval. Define the average disease-free rate among the silent 
producers under the effective program as  Str , and that under the baseline program in period t  
as Str . The corresponding premiums for the two programs are thus ( )St tI I r    and ( )St tI I r  
respectively. In Lemma 4 we will compare those two premiums assuming that S St tr r  always 
holds. In Proposition 3 to follow we will show that Assumption 2 suffices to ensure S St tr r .  
Lemma 4: If S St tr r , then t tI I . 
 
Next we will compare the price premium of the effective program with that of the baseline 
program for every period. 
                                                            
5 Here core variables refer to the variables that are mutually complementary and are assumed to 
be central to the firm’s activities.  
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Proposition 3: Compared to the baseline program, the effective program always generates a 
greater expected price premium whenever Assumption 2 holds. That is 1t  , t tI I . 
  
4.  Participation mandate 
A mandatory program requires all producers to participate, but does not require disclosure. The 
incentive to voluntarily participate in mandatory programs is often overlooked. This is a pity 
because mandates are likely to be most unpopular and likely ineffective when the post-mandate 
equilibrium involves a large fraction of involuntary participants. In this section we will show 
that the premium reaches a maximum when a program is mandatory. Therefore a mandate 
creates the greatest incentive for producers to remain in the program, given the strategic 
complementarity among participation decisions. Stated differently, upon passage of time the 
mandate may turn some involuntary participants into voluntary ones. 
We assume that there is no non-participant in the mandatory program. Again by Grossman 
and Hart (1980), the average disease-free rate among silent producers will be r . So although 
disclosure is voluntary, universal disclosure is a natural by-product of the mandate. By (3) the 
expected participation premium is: 
 
1
max ( ) ( )rI r r dF r   (7) 
By Lemma 1, we know that max max ( )S
t
S
tr
I I r , where [ , ]S etr r r  is defined in eqn. (5). 
Therefore, the premium under a mandate will be no less than that under a voluntary program.  
Two types of participants can exist in a mandatory program. Motivated type A participants 
incur a lower cost than the premium under full participation. They have ex-post incentives to 
participate. The remainder belong to unmotivated type B, who participate only when the 
government spends effort auditing and imposes a fine on non-participants. According to this 
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definition, we present three possible equilibria as shown in Figure 3. These are when: 
1. maxc I c  , as represented by area M1. There exist a mixture of motivated type A and 
unmotivated type B participants in the market. Participants with max[ , )c c I  are motivated 
types while those with max( , ]c I c  are unmotivated types; 
2. maxc I , as represented by M2. The market is comprised solely of type B participants;  
3. maxc I , as represented by M3. The market is comprised solely of motivated types.  
Note that region M3 in Figure 3 contains exactly regions R4, R5 and R6 in Figure 2. That 
is, only type A participants exist under the mandate whenever FP is an equilibrium in the 
voluntary program. This is because a participation mandate maximizes the incentive for 
producers to join. According to our calculations in Example 1, we know that this example will 
be located in region M3 under the mandate. Therefore the market is comprised solely of type A 
participants. No participant will deviate from participation even were the government to spend 
no effort on auditing. When the cost structure lies in region M1, which is most likely when cost 
structures vary widely (as in the U.S. beef sector) in reality, then opposition from some 
producers is inevitable. As documented earlier, Texas tick fever eradication and NAIS 
programs encountered resolute resistance during their implementation.  
 
5.  Simulation 
In this section we use JD as an example for simulation purposes. One objective of this section 
is to understand whether the current participation rate will increase or stagnate in the long run. 
We also calculate the percentage of motivated type A participants under the alternative 
mandatory program. Similar to Example 1, we use uniform distributions to capture a 
producers’ cost structure and herd disease-free rate. Model parameter values are based on the 
current literature on Johne’s disease. We assume throughout that the average disease-free rate 
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is uniformly distributed, or [ ,1]r U r , as is the participation cost, or [ , ]c U c c .  
 
5.1.  Voluntary program 
By (3), in the baseline program the expected premium in period t  is calculated as:  
 
21 1 (1 )( ) ( ) ( )
1 2(1 )
.
S S
t t
S S
S S t t
t t tr r
r r rI I r r r dF r dr
r r
           (8) 
For simplicity, we choose a linear technology that satisfies the definition of a technologically 
effective program; ( ) 0.5(1 )r r   . This technology is appealing because it reflects 
decreasing marginal returns, i.e., the increase in disease-free rate is 0.5(1 ) 0.5(1 )r r r    , 
which is decreasing in the value of r . 
The period t expected premium in the technologically effective program is:  
 
1
1 1
( ) 2 1
2
( ) ( ) ( ) (0.5 0.5 )
1
   (1 ) .
1
S S
t t
S S S
t t t tr r
S
t
I I r r r dF r r r dr
r
r
r

 

         
 
      

 (9) 
By (5), the disease-free rate among silent sellers in period 1t   is:  
 
1
1
( ) [1 ( )] ;
( ) ( )( ) ; ( ) ; ( ) ;
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1
0.5( ); 0.5(1 ). 
1
S
t
S
t
S
t
S S e S e
t t tr r
S S
S St t t t
t t tS
t t t
re S e
tSr r r r
t
r r r r r
G I F r I c r rr G I F r
G I F r G I c c r
r rr dr r r r dr r
r r r
 

 

  
      
       
 (10) 
From an initial value of 0
er r  we calculate premium 0I  by either (8), when considering the 
baseline program, or (9), when considering the technologically effective program. Next when 
0r  and 0I  are known, 1r  will be solved by use of (10). For 1t  , tI  and 1tr   can be computed 
in turn. Lastly, participation rate ( )tG I  can be obtained in each period given tI .  
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5.2.  Mandate 
By (7), under the baseline program the expected premium from participation is maxI 
11(1 ) ( ) 0.5 (1 )
r
r r r dr r     : and the fraction of motivated type A participants is 
(0.5 (1 )) [0.5 (1 ) ] / ( )G r r c c c      .  
 
5.3.  Parameter values and period length 
We use the simple average of quarterly prices for replacement milk cows weighted by state 
cow numbers to calculate replacement cow prices in 2006, 2007 and 2008 (USDA 2010b). For 
2009 and 2010, we use the first quarter milk cow prices as provided by USDA: NASS. Our 
estimate of the value of a healthy dairy cow is just the simple average of prices over these five 
years, $1, 696V  . For cows infected with Johne’s disease, the estimated slaughter value is 
assumed to be in the range 0-30% of the original value (Groenendaal and Galligan 2003). To 
be conservative we assume that 0  .  
It is estimated that the average within-herd prevalence in the United States is about 5.5% 
(USDA 2005) so we set 0.945er  . As we assume that the herd disease-free rate is uniformly 
distributed on [ ,1]r , it follows that ~ [0.89,1]r U . The cost of the JD control program ranges 
from $5.79 to $81.07 per cow per year (Pillars et al. 2009), and we assume that the cost is 
uniformly distributed on [$5.79, $81.07]. 
According to USDA (2010a), pp. 21 to 22, a classification test must be implemented 
annually for the herd at levels 1 to 4 establish or maintain a classification level. For herds at 
levels 5 to 6, this test is required every two years. Therefore the program period as specified in 
the simulation model can be viewed as ranging between one and two years.  
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5.4.  Results 
Equations (8) and (10) generate the participation rates under the voluntary baseline program for 
the first 20 periods, as displayed in Figure 4. Under the voluntary program, the participation 
rate increases slightly in the beginning and then stabilizes at just below 30%. This suggests that 
the current VJDHSP is unlikely to attract the majority of producers. Under the mandate 
however 100% of participants are content. So the current voluntary program supports an 
equilibrium located in region R4 of Figure 2 while a mandate supports an equilibrium located 
in region M3 of Figure 3. Therefore both PP and FP are equilibria in the voluntary program. 
Later on we will illustrate how the PP equilibrium can be tipped into the FP equilibrium.  
Sensitivity analysis in regard to r ,   and V  are explored in the supplemental materials. 
We devote the remainder of this section to policy and allied considerations. 
 
5.6.  Subsidy and tipping 
Suppose that the government provides temporary subsidies to a proportion of producers. These 
subsidies may eventually motivate all producers to participate in the voluntary program. Due to 
our momentum inference in Proposition 2, subsidies will no longer be necessary after a certain 
proportion of producers participate. We assume that ~ [0.89,1]r U , ~ [$5.79,$81.07]c U , V 
$1,696  and 0  . The simulation is displayed in Figure 5. 
The equilibrium without subsidy will be reached at around the 5th period, where 29% of 
producers participate and the price premium is $27 for participation. In the 6th period, suppose 
the government provides subsidies to 30% of producers. Specifically, suppose the government 
provides a uniform subsidy of $55 to all producers whose cost lies in the upper 30 percentile of 
the cost distribution, i.e., [$58.47,$81.07]c U . Then their cost will fall below $27 and it will 
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become profitable for them to participate. So long as low cost participants do not believe that 
they would become eligible for subsidies were they to procrastinate then the timing of the 
subsidies will not affect their participation decision.  
In reality, as the smaller producers are more likely to incur higher participation costs, 
government could provide subsidies to the 30% of producers that are smallest in scale once it is 
realized that the participation rate is leveling off. Then the participation rate will climb again 
and the new full participation equilibrium will be reached after another 13 periods. The FP 
equilibrium will generate a price premium of $85. Thus no producer in the FP equilibrium has 
the incentive to deviate from it even without a government subsidy. An alternative approach 
that could more quickly and more reliably secure a high participation rate would be to 
subsidize small producer participation right from the outset. 
 
5.7.  Cost heterogeneity 
We compare ~c [$5.79,$81.07]U  with a distribution that is a mean-preserving decrease in 
dispersion, ~c [$15.79,$71.07]U . We also choose two different values for  , namely -0.5 
and 0.3. We do this to show that the effects of cost heterogeneity can be dramatically altered by 
the perceived magnitude of damage. The resulting participation rates are displayed in Figures 
6(a)-6(b). In the case of a less heterogeneous cost structure, the equilibrium participation rate is 
either close to 0% (i.e., NP) or 100% (i.e., FP), while a more heterogeneous cost structure 
results in the PP equilibrium. When the participation premium increases relative to cost and 
costs are less heterogeneous then FP will result. This simulation result conforms to our 
observations based on Figure 2.  
 
5.8.  Program effectiveness 
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From equations (9)-(10) we obtain participation rates under the technologically effective 
program for the first 20 periods. Compared to the baseline program, the effect of program 
effectiveness on participation is displayed in Figure 7. When the program is effective in 
increasing the herd-level disease-free rate, the participation rate will increase in every period. 
The equilibrium participation rate will also increase. In our case FP is reached under the 
effective program. Intuitively, this is because if the program proves to be more effective then 
sellers can expect to obtain a larger price premium which will strengthen participation 
incentives among sellers. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
With specific reference to animal disease, this paper provides a dynamic, industry-level model 
of a voluntary program where positive participation externalities exist. We show that, due to 
strategic complementarity, momentum builds whereby both premium and participation rate 
increase iteratively in a mutually reinforcing manner and may in time support full participation 
even without government subsidies. This is in contrast with much of the current literature on 
infectious animal disease management programs, which implicitly assumes that incentives for 
voluntary participation come either from direct productivity effects or government subsidies.  
Secondly, we show that the participation premium and participation rate are contingent on 
disease consequences to human health, disease prevalence rate and unit livestock value. For 
example, if consumers perceive a serious human health consequence then a full participation 
equilibrium can be more readily attained.  
We point out that, due to strategic complementarity, a program mandate maximizes the 
price premium and thus the incentive to participate. The private benefits to participation will be 
larger when calculated after the mandate is implemented. As our historical review attests, many 
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initially hostile to a mandate may think differently afterwards. Theoretically, a sticks approach 
can dominates a carrots approach in regard to participation incentives. However enforcing the 
mandate might be difficult at the outset, and when heterogeneity in implementation cost is 
large then many producers may never benefit from the mandate. A voluntary program with 
modest government subsidies might be welcome by all producers, perhaps in part because of 
the positive publicity generated (Lyon 2003). Subsidies would also place some of the costs on 
taxpayers/consumers, who may be content to pay for greater confidence in the food supply 
chain. A voluntary approach may also afford producers with sufficient time to appreciate 
program benefits and initiate a virtuous cycle at low political cost.  
Finally, as demonstrated in the application to Johne’s disease, our theoretical model can 
also be tailored for simulation purposes. This allows us to predict under given situations how 
the program participation rate may evolve over time, a feature that has not been explored in the 
existing literature. Our simulation results indicate that full participation is unlikely under the 
status quo. We also illustrate the process of tipping in the simulation, where the government 
could secure a FP equilibrium by subsidizing high cost producers. Therefore the success and 
cost effectiveness of a voluntary Johne’s disease control program, or of livestock disease 
control programs in general, hinges crucially on obtaining the right statistics as well as 
educating producers and consumers.  
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Period  t begins (t > 0)
Producers observe premium It-1
Proportion 0t of producers participate
Participants make disclosure decision based on 
disease free rate of silent producers
and  It are determined.
Move on to period t+1
1
S
tr 
S
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Figure 1. A flow chart of the model scheme. 
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Figure 2. Equilibria under different cost structures—voluntary program. 
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Figure 3. Participant types under different costs—mandatory program. 
 
Figure 4. Participation rate and ratio of motivated Type A producers to all producers.  
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Figure 5. Subsidy and tipping— 0  . 
 
Figure 6(a). Cost heterogeneity— 0.5   . 
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Figure 6(b). Cost heterogeneity— 0.3  . 
 
 
Figure 7. Effective program vs. baseline program. 
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Supplemental Materials 
Lemma 1: The expected premium from participation will increase whenever one of the 
following holds: i) Society becomes more aware of the disease, / 0tI    ; ii) the value of an 
animal increases, / 0tI V   , or iii) the average disease-free rate among silent producers 
decreases, / 0St tI r   . 
Proof: The inferences follow from ( ) / ( ) / (1 ) 0t tI I       , ( ) / ( / ) 0t tI V I V       
and ( ) / ( 1) [1 ( )] 0Stt
S
tI Vr rF      .     
 
Lemma 2: Under a voluntary program, when min maxI c c I    then at least two equilibria 
exist. These are NP and FP.  
Proof: If no producer participates, then 0
S er r . The expected premium from participation is
minI . As minI c , nobody participates. Therefore * *( , ) ( ,0)er r   is one equilibrium. If all 
producers participate, then r r . The expected premium from participation is maxI . As c 
maxI , all producers will participate. Thus 
* *( , ) ( ,1)r r   is another equilibrium.     
 
Proposition 1: Producer participation decisions are strategic complements. That is, whenever 
1 0t t      then ( ) ( )S St t t tr r    and ( ( )) ( ( ))S St t t t t tI r I r   . 
Proof: By equation (5) we have 
1
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))S
t
S e e
t t t tr r
r r r    
    where ( )t  
1 1( ) / [ ( ) 1 ]
S S
t t t t tF r F r       whenever 1t  . If 1t  , then (1)Str r . Given 1Str   fixed, we can 
easily show that ( )St tr   is decreasing in t . Thus t t    implies ( ) ( )S St t t tr r   . By Lemma 
1 it follows that ( ( )) ( ( ))S St t t t t tI r I r   .     
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Assumption 2 always holds whenever both the average disease-free rate and participation cost 
are uniformly distributed as ~ [0,1]r U  and ~ [0, ]c U c , and also (1 ) 2V c    . 
Proof: Obviously Se er rr r   is decreasing in Sr . Therefore, Assumption 2 will automatically 
hold whenever ( )Sr  is decreasing in Sr , i.e., whenever
  2
2
( ) 1 ( )
( ) ( ) 1 ( )
( ) [1 ( )][ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )]
( ) ( ) 1 ( ) [ ( ) ( ) 1 ( )]
( )(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) ( 0.
[ ( ) ( ) 1 ( )
)
]
S S
S S S S S
S S S S S S S
S S S S S S
S S S S S
S S S
d r d g r
dr dr g r F r g r
g r g r g r F r g r F r g r
g r F r g r g r F r g r
g r g r F r g r F r
g r F r g r
    
         
    
 
This condition is equivalent to  
 ( ) ( ( )(1 ( ) () ) ).S S S S Sg r F r g r g r F r    (SM-1) 
When the average disease-free rate is uniformly distributed as ~ [0,1]r U  and participation 
costs satisfy ~ [0, ]c U c , then ( )S SF r r , ( ) 1SF r   and )( SI r  1 ( )
S
S
r
r r dr    
20.5 (1 )Sr  . 
If )( SI r c , then ( ) 1Sg r  , ( ) 0Sg r   and Condition (SM-1) holds with equality. If 
)( SI r c , then 1 2( ( ) / 0.5 () 1 ) /SS S Srg r r r d r cr c     , and ( ) (1 ) / 0S Sg r r c     . 
Under these specifications we can show that condition (SM-1) always holds as  
 
2 2
2
    (1 ) 0.5 (1 ) 1 0.5/ ( / /
[
(1 ) )
2 (1 ) 1 0.5 (1 / ])
S S S S
S S S
c cr r r r
r r r
c
c
  

    
    
 
 (SM-2) 
Assuming that 2c  , condition (SM-2) will hold if we can show 2 Sr  2(1 ) 1 (1 ])[S Sr r   , 
which immediately holds as 2 (1 )(2 )S Sr r   .     
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Proposition 2: Under Assumption 2, then over time the i) average disease-free rate among 
silent producers is non-increasing, i.e., 10
S S S
kr r r   ; ii) participation premium is non-
decreasing, i.e., 0 1 kI I I   ; iii) participation rate is non-decreasing, i.e., 10 k     .  
Proof: The proof of part i) is by induction. Similar to (5) and (6), we have 
 0 0
1 1
1 0 0 0
2 1 1 1
( ) [1 ( )] ( )[ ],
( ) [1 ( )] ( )[ ].
S S
S S
S S e S e e S e e
r r r r
S S e S e e S e e
r r r r
r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r r r
  
  
 
 
    
     

 
First we know by equation (3) that 0 1
eS Sr r r  . We can then prove that 1 2S Sr r  if 
1
1( )[ ]S
S e e
r r
r r r  00( )[ ]SS e er rr r r   , which immediately hold under Assumption 2.  
Next, suppose that 1
S S
t tr r   holds, we can then prove 1S St tr r  . Again, similar to (5) and (6),  
1
1
1
( )[ ],
( )[ ].
S
t
S
t
S e S e e
t t r r
S e S e e
t t r r
r r r r r
r r r r r


 
 
  
    
In order to have 1
S S
t tr r  , we need the following condition to hold: 
 
1
1( )[ ] ( )[ ].S S
t t
S e e S e e
t tr r r r
r r r r r r 
     (SM-3) 
Again, (SM-3) holds whenever Assumption 2 is true. 
Next, inference ii) holds by inference i) and Lemma 1. Based on Lemma 4 and the 
assumption that 0 0  , inference iii) follows immediately.     
 
Lemma 4: If S St tr r , then t tI I . 
Proof: By Lemma 1 we have ( ) ( )S St t tI I r I r     whenever S St tr r . Under the effective 
program at least producers with Str r  can get the price premium. Therefore: 
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1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
S S
t t
S S S S
t t t t t tr r
I I r r r dF r r r dF r I r I                  
 
Proposition 3: Compared to the baseline program, the effective program always generates a 
greater expected price premium whenever Assumption 2 holds. That is 1t  , t tI I . 
Proof: As 0 0
S S er r r  , by Lemma 4 we know that 0 0I I , which implies that 1 1   under 
Lemma 3. Then use Proposition 1 to conclude that 1 1
S Sr r .  
The next step resembles the proof of Proposition 2, part i). Similar to (5), we have 
 
 
 
1 1
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) ,
( ) [1 ( )] ( ) .
S S
t t
S S
t t
S S e S e e S e e
t t t tr r r
S S e S e e S e e
t t t tr r r
r r r r r r r r r
r r r r r r r r r
  
  
 
 
  
  
    
    

     
 
Conditional on Assumption 2, we can easily see that 2 2
S Sr r  as 1 1S Sr r . Similarly we know 
that 1t  , S St tr r . By applying Lemma 4 again, we have 1t  , t tI I .     
 
Sensitivity analysis in simulation. 
In this section we will carry out sensitivity analyses with regard to r ,   and V . Other 
parameters fixed, we obtain the participation rates for the first 20 periods as shown in Figure 
SM1(a) by choosing   among { 1, 0.6,0,0.3}  . Similarly, we choose r 
{0.8,0.82,0.85,0.95} and the participation rate dynamics are provided in Figure SM1(b). 
Finally, we choose {$1,300,V   $1,500,$1,700,$1,900} and simulations are displayed in 
Figure SM1(c). The results in Figure SM1(a) follow from Lemma 1 and 3, where a lower   
indicates a larger premium in the initial period and thus a greater participation rate during 
period 1. Next, by the strategic complementarity property proved in Proposition 1 we know 
that the equilibrium participation rate will increase as well. Similarly, Figures SM1(b) and 
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SM1(c) can be explained by a combination of lemmas 1 and 3.  
Figure SM1(a) shows how the consequences of JD affect participation rates in a voluntary 
program. For example, when losses are due to decreasing productivity, we might reasonably 
assume that 0.3  . In this case the participation rate stabilizes at about 18%. However, were 
JD shown to have significant zoonotic effects then   would likely be negative. In cases where 
{ 1, 0.6}   , FP equilibrium will be reached. Figure SM1(b) indicates that the equilibrium 
participation rate can be influenced by producer’s beliefs on within-herd disease prevalence. 
While our simulations have less than 10% of producers participating when the average 
prevalence rate is 2.5%, FP will be realized whenever average prevalence reaches 10%. 
Increased unit cow value will also enhance equilibrium participation, but to a very limited 
extent because the value range is narrow. From Figure SM1(c) we can see that, all else fixed, 
FP will not be attained even if the unit value is $2,500. The effect of unit animal value on 
participation rate can also explain why the participation rate for beef herds is much lower than 
that for dairy herds (Wells, Hartmann, and Anderson 2008), although participation costs are 
also likely higher.  
A more general comment on Figure SM1(c) is that participation rates, and so eventually 
disease-free rates, increase as value to be protected increases. This value could take the form of 
non-stock production assets such as feeding, housing and manure management investments. 
Such assets provide another form of complementarity beyond the present model; namely 
between a particular grower’s asset value at risk and the participation decision rather than 
between grower participation decisions. But the two forms of complementarity will themselves 
interact in a complementary manner. That is, regions with a preponderance of competitive 
species X growers will have high asset values to protect and will participate. This will 
encourage others in the region to participate and a high region-wide participation rate is likely 
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to promote further investment in the region’s species X production sector. On the other hand, if 
a region has a marginal species X production sector then there will be low incentive to 
participate and this just confirms the region’s low sector productivity. 
 
Voluntary Program---Coarse Grading 
In this section we will present our model under the alternative assumption of a coarse grading 
test. A coarse grading test only distinguishes two possible cases. Producers obtain a certificate 
when their disease-free rate is above a threshold rˆ  and no certificate otherwise. The unit 
livestock price of a non-participating herd is 1 (1 )S St t tp r V r V   , while the realized unit price 
of one that participates takes the following form:  
 2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1 )         whenever  ,
ˆ(1 )      whenever  .
S S
t t
t e e
r r r r
r V r V r r
p
r V r V r r

 
       
 
Therefore the realized premium received by a producer who participates is:  
 2 1
ˆ
ˆ0, whenever   ;
ˆ( )      whenever   .t t e Sr r t
r r
p p
r r r r 
    
 
The expected price premium from participating is thus:   
 
1
ˆ ˆˆ
ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )[1 ( )].c S e S e St r r t r r trI r r r r dF r r r F r        (SM-4) 
Here ( )cI   represents the price premium function in the coarse grading case. Next, we will 
show that in the coarse grading system, price premium depends only on the lowest threshold. 
The number of thresholds and the value of other thresholds will not affect the premium. 
Therefore without loss of generality, we will focus on the single threshold case. 
Proposition SM1: Suppose there are two coarse grading programs with 1 2ˆ ˆr r . Program 1 
offers the certificate whenever the tested disease-free rate satisfies 1ˆr r . Program 2 offers a 
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level 1 certificate whenever 1 2ˆ ˆ[ , )r r r , and a level 2 certificate whenever 2ˆr r . The 
expected premiums generated by the two programs are the same.  
Proof :According to (SM-1), the expected price premium for program 1 is: 
 1 1ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( )[1 ( )]
c S e S
t tr r
I r r r r F r     (SM-5) 
The realized price charged by a producer participating in program 2 takes the following form:  
 1 2 1 2
2 2
1
2 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ ˆ
ˆ(1 ) , whenever   
ˆ ˆ(1 ) , whenever  
ˆ(1 ) , whenever 
;
 
;
 .
S S
t t
e e
t r r r r r r
e e
r r r r
r V r V r r
p r V r V r r r
r V r V r r



   
 
          
 
Since the unit livestock price from non-participating is 1 (1 )S St t tp r V r V   , we can 
calculate the realized premium from participating in program 2 as:  
 1 2
2
1
2 1 1 2
ˆ ˆ
2
ˆ
ˆ0, whenever   
ˆ ˆ( ),          whenever   
ˆ( ), whenever   
;
;
.
e S
t t tr r r
e S
tr r
r r
p p r r r r r
r r r r


 

       
 
The expected price premium from participating in program 2 is: 
 
2
1 2 21 2
1 2 2
1 2 2
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   
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 (SM-6) 
This is exactly the expected price premium generated by program 1, as shown in (SM-5).     
 
In the coarse grading case, silent producers are comprised of two groups: participants who 
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fail to obtain the certificate, and non-participants. Similar to the equilibrium defined in the fine 
grading case, we will define the equilibrium under single-threshold coarse grading as: 
 
* *
ˆ
*
* * *
*
* *
( ) [1 ( )] ;
ˆ( ) ˆ( ) ; ( ( , )).
ˆ( ) 1
e e
r r
c
r r r rr
r F r G I r r
F r
 
  
  
  
 (SM-7) 
As a counterpart to Figure 2 in the voluntary fine grading case, Figure SM2 displays all 
possible types of equilibria when cost structures differ. As an example, we will show by 
Proposition SM2 that there are at least two possible equilibria in region R5. The proof 
resembles that in Lemma 2. 
Proposition SM2: Under the voluntary program coarse grading case, NP and FP are two 
possible equilibria when ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )
c e c e
r rI r r c c I r r   .  
 
We seek now to prove Proposition SM3, a counterpart to Proposition 2 in the fine grading 
case. In order to do so we will first show in Lemma SM1 that a counterpart of Assumption 2 
always holds in the coarse grading case. 
Lemma SM1: In the coarse grading case, an equivalent to Assumption 2 of the fine grading 
case will always hold. That is ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )( )
S S e e
t t r rJ r r r r r r    is decreasing in [ , ]S etr r r  where 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ( , )) ( ) / ( ( , )) ( ) 1 ( ( , ))S c S c S c St t t tr r G I r r F r G I r r F r G I r r      .  
Proof: As ˆe er rr r   is a constant, we only need ˆ( , )Str r  to be decreasing in [ , ]S etr r r . This is 
obvious as ˆ( ( , ))c StG I r r  is decreasing in Str  and ˆ( )F r  is fixed.     
 
Proposition SM3: In coarse grading case, the following three inferences always apply: i) 
average disease-free rate among silent producers will be non-increasing, i.e., 10
S S S
kr r r   ; 
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ii) participation premium will be non-decreasing, i.e., 0 1 kI I I    ( ( )c Sk kI I r ); iii) 
participation rate will be non-decreasing, i.e., 10 k     . 
Proof: The proof follows directly from Proposition 2 and Lemma SM1.     
 
Lastly we will briefly revisit Example 1 in the coarse grading case, where an additional 
threshold parameter takes value ˆ 0.98r  . It follows that:  
1 1
0.98 0.98
ˆ 0.98 0.98ˆ 0.98
[ ]ˆ( , ) [ ] ( ) 0.8 500 4.
1 0.90
e e
c e e e r r
r r r rr
r rI r r r r dF r dr            
Therefore ˆ ˆ( , )
c e
r rc c I r r  . Now the case of Example 1 is located in region R3 of Figure 
SM2, where the only equilibrium is NP and tipping will not occur. Therefore strategic 
complementarity as provided in Proposition SM3, may not lead to tipping. Next we will show 
that in a more general setup, coarse grading generates a smaller expected price premium, i.e., 
less incentive for producers to participate.  
Proposition SM4: Assume that ˆ er r . Then price premium under the coarse grading system 
ˆ( , )c StI r r  is no greater than that under the fine grading system, ( )
S
tI r  for any given [0,1]
S
tr  .  
Proof: Calculate 
 
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ
1
ˆ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ˆ           ( ) ( )   (  )
           (
By
).
S
c S e S S
t r r t tr r
S S e
t tr
S
t
I r r r r dF r r r dF r
r r dF r r r r
I r
 

   
   

 


 
 
Note that condition ˆ er r , which means that participants only obtain a certificate when 
their disease-free rate is above the average, is a sufficient condition for Proposition SM4 to 
hold. This is because 0
S S e
tr r r   (by eqn. (5)), so producers with disease-free rate ˆ( , ]Str r r  
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will obtain a premium in the fine grading case, but not in a coarse grading case. Thus ex-ante a 
producer has a lower expected premium in the coarse grading system.  
 
Mandate---Coarse Grading 
The average disease-free rate among silent producers, who are comprised solely of the 
producers that obtain no certificate, is ˆ ˆ( | )
e
r rr E r r r   . Thus by (SM-4) the expected price 
premium from participation is: 
 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ( , ) [1 ( )][ ].
c e e e
r r r r r rI r r F r r r      (SM-8) 
Similar to Figure 3, Figure SM3 also displays three possible cases. These are:  
1. ˆ ˆ( , )
c e
r rc I r r c  . This cost structure is represented by region M1, where both types of 
participants exist. Those participants with ˆ ˆ[ , ( , ))
c e
r rc c I r r  are motivated type A 
participants, and those with ˆ ˆ( ( , ), ]
c e
r rc I r r c  are type B participants; 
2. ˆ ˆ( , )
c e
r rc I r r . This is represented by M2, where the market is solely comprised of 
unmotivated type B participants;  
3. ˆ ˆ( , )
c e
r rc I r r . This is represented by M3, where the market is solely comprised of 
motivated type A participants.  
As ˆ ˆ5.5 ( , ) 4
c e
r rc I r r   , we know that the case in Example 1 is now located in M2. This 
means that the market is comprised solely of type B participants, who would choose not to 
participate if the government spends no effort on auditing. As ˆ maxˆ( , )
c e
r rI r r I  ,6 region M3 of 
Figure 4 is larger than M3 of Figure SM3. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the coarse grading 
                                                            
6 This follows as a combination of results in Proposition SM4 and Lemma 1. The former 
implies that ˆ ˆˆ( , ) ( )
c e e
r r r rI r r I r  , while from the latter we know that ˆ max( )er rI r I  .  
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incentive structure entails no less implementation cost than the fine grading structure. 
For the purposes of simulation we assume that the average disease-free rate is uniformly 
distributed as ~ [ ,1]r U r  and participation cost is uniformly distributed as ~ [ , ]c U c c .  
 
Voluntary program: Coarse grading 
By (SM-4), the expected price premium from participating in the program in period t  is: 
 
1
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ( ) 1ˆ ˆ( , ) (0.5(1 ) ) .
1 1
 
e S
c S Sr r t
t tr
r r rI r r dr r r
r r
         (SM-9) 
Similar to (11), the disease-free rate among silent sellers in period 1t   is:  
 
ˆ1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ( , ) [1 ( , )] ;
ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( )ˆ( , ) ; 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ( ) 1 ( ( , ))
ˆ ˆ( , )ˆ ˆ( ( , )) ; ( ) ; 
1
ˆ 1; . 
2 2
S S e S e
t t r r t
c S
S t
t c S c S
t t
c S
c S t
t
e e
r r
r r r r r r r
G I r r F rr r
G I r r F r G I r r
I r r c r rG I r r F r
c c r
r r rr r
 

 

  
  
   
  
 (SM-10) 
From initial values 0
S er r  and rˆ , we can calculate the premium 0 0 ˆ( , )SI I r r  by (SM-9). 
Then given 0
Sr and 0I , we can solve for 1
Sr  by (SM-10) and tI  and 1
S
tr   can be solved for 1t   
while participation rate ˆ( ( , ))c StG I r r  in each period can also be obtained.  
 
Mandate: Coarse grading 
The expected price premium from participating in the program is: 
 
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ( )(1 )ˆ( , )
1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ[0.5(1 ) 0.5( )](1 ) ˆ               = 0.5 (1 ).
1
e e e e
c e r r r r r r r r
r r r
r r r r rI r r dr
r r
r r r r r
r
 
 
   

    
     

 (SM-11) 
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Thus among market participants the proportion with the incentive to participate is: 
 
ˆ0.5 (1 )ˆ(0.5 (1 )) .r cG r
c c
      (SM-12)
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Figure SM1(a). Participation rates under different values of  .  
 
 
Figure SM1(b). Participation rates under different values of r .  
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Figure SM1(c). Participation rates under different values of V .  
 
ˆ( , )c eI r r
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Figure SM2. Equilibria under different cost structures—Voluntary program, coarse grading. 
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Figure SM3. Participant types under different costs—Mandatory program, coarse grading. 
 
 
